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Redefining Trade Secrets in North Carolina
ABSTRACT
North Carolina has a trade secrets problem, and it resides at the most
elementary part of the doctrine: the definition. In the North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act, the general assembly established an
elemental, two-prong test for identifying a trade secret. Courts
adjudicating trade secrets cases, however, have strayed from this
definition, instead applying a six-factor balancing test that common law
courts used before enactment of statutory trade secret definitions. This
bifurcated development has not only created an inconsistent
jurisprudence-it has also cultivated fundamental problems in the North
Carolina legal system. Namely, North Carolina courts have infringed on
the province of the legislative branch, changed the law governing trade
secret claims, and prompted practitioner confusion.
This Comment traces the development of trade secret law nationwide
and, more specifically, within North Carolina. It identifies where courts
went wrong in their trade secret jurisprudence. Through discussion of the
problems of the judicially created six-factor test, this Comment advocates
for a simple, straightforward solution. That is, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should steer lower courts back to the statutory definition.
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INTRODUCTION
Trade secret law protects businesses or individuals who develop
proprietary information and confidentially disclose that information to
employees or others.! The law provides a remedy when those confidants
misappropriate the secret by disclosing it or using it to their own
advantage.2 Developed through the courts and, later, by statute,3 trade
secret doctrine protects secret information such as recipes, formulae,
business methods, business plans, software source code, and customer
lists.4 Information must do more than meet a particular classification,
though; trade secret law only protects information that meets certain
requirements.5 This began in the common law, when courts would only
protect confidential business information that was sufficiently secret and
valuable.6 Later, the restrictions on what information was a trade secret
became baked into the statutory definitions of trade secrets.'
1. See ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01
(2017).
2. See, e.g, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-153 (2017).
3. See infra Part I.
4. THE TRADE SECRET HANDBOOK 1-2 (Michael J. Lockerby ed. 2000).
5. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (defining "trade secret").
6. See infra Section I.A. 1.
7. See, e.g, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (declaring that a "trade secret" is business
information such as formulae, methods, and techniques "that (a) [d]erives independent
actual or potential commercial value from not being generally known ... and (b) [i]s the
subject of efforts ... to maintain its secrecy" (emphasis added)). In North Carolina, a trade
secret is not simply confidential business information-it must be confidential business
information that also meets the requirements of value and secrecy. See id
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Because of the bifurcated development through the judiciary and
legislature, different definitions have been used to identify trade secrets.
The definitions are similar-the statutory definitions were built on the
foundation of a nearly universal common law definition-but vary in slight
but significant ways.9 North Carolina courts have overlooked the nuance of
this development, sometimes conflating the different definitions or even
outright ignoring the binding legislative definition."o This has created an
anomaly in trade secret law that now needs resolution. And, the
implications are not trivial; every trade secrets action requires the plaintiff
to demonstrate that a trade secret existed," and the definition of a trade
secret governs that determination.
This Comment explores the discrepancy that has arisen in North
Carolina trade secret law. Part I discusses the origin and development of
trade secret law nationwide. Part I then turns its focus to North Carolina
and specifically examines the Trade Secrets Protection Act and how courts
have conflated statutory and common law principles in regards to the
definition of a trade secret. Part H analyzes three problems this conflation
causes: (1) a separation of powers problem, (2) a substantive problem, and
(3) a practical problem. Part III proposes a solution for these problems.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE SECRET LAW: NATIONWIDE AND NORTH
CAROLINA
Trade secret law originated in England before coursing through the
common law of American states and into statute books across the country.
This Part traces that development and examines how the definition of a
trade secret morphed as the doctrine spread. This Part then turns its focus
to North Carolina, which rarely adjudicated trade secrets until the North
Carolina General Assembly commandeered the doctrine from the courts in
the early 1980s.
8. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(establishing the six factors used in identifying trade secrets), with N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 66-152(3) (providing a statutory definition used to identify trade secrets).
9. See infra Section I.B.2.
10. See infra Part III.
11. Joseph E. Root III & Guy M. Blynn, Abandonment of Common-Law Principles:
The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 823, 836 (1982)
("[The trade secret] definition assumes significance primarily because courts generally treat
the existence vel non of a trade secret as a threshold question to whether an action for
misappropriation exists.").
645
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A. National Development of Trade Secret Law
To understand the import of the constituent parts of the trade secrets
definition, it is important to understand how trade secret doctrine
contracted and expanded before settling on the type of information it
protects.
1. Origin of Trade Secret Protection: A Common Law Doctrine
The concept of protecting the proprietary information of businesses
extends deep into the nation's legal history.12 Specifically, state courts
began providing trade secret protection nearly 150 years ago," when the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts adopted English trade secret law and held
that an employee can be liable for disclosure of secrets learned during the
course of employment. 14 The policy underlying this new protection was
the encouragement of commercial enterprise.1 5 Just as entrepreneurs can
obtain protection for patents and trademarks, the court decided that the
government should protect processes, too.16 Thus, the following doctrine
became the origin of trade secret law in the United States:
If he invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture,
whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an exclusive
right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire
knowledge of it; but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will
protect against one who in violation of contract and breach of confidence
undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons. The
jurisdiction in equity to interfere by injunction to prevent such a breach of
trust, when the injury would be irreparable and the remedy at law
inadequate, is well established by authority.17
With that affirmative declaration, Massachusetts provided the nation's first
definition of a trade secret-one that included elements of manufacturing
process, confidence, exclusivity, and value.
Subsequent definitions tendered by state courts built on this
foundation. In 1886, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey adopted the
12. See, e.g, Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1859)
("[]nventors... are... entitled to protection against frauds or wrongs practiced to pirate
from them the results of thought and labor, in which nearly a lifetime may have been
exhausted....").
13. Kewanee v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 492-93, 493 n.23 (1974) (citing Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868)).
14. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 459-60.
15. Id. at 457.
16. Id. at 457-58.
17. Id. at 458.
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Massachusetts law nearly verbatim and declared that "peculiar methods and
processes" could receive trade secret protection.18 In 1889, the New York
Court of Appeals recognized that secret formulae could constitute trade
secrets but also noted a contraction of the doctrine: protection extended
only to the moment at which the public discovered the secret information in
good faith.1 9 Thus, New York built on the Massachusetts law by increasing
the types of information that could constitute a trade secret while also
imposing disqualifiers on those types of information.
An 1891 opinion from the Supreme Court of South Dakota added new
wrinkles to this emerging law.20 The court held that a company had
exclusive rights in a retail catalogue it developed because "[i]t was the
product of the skill and labors" of the company.21 While determining that
the catalogue was clearly a trade secret, the court noted that it was
"prepared at great expense" by the company and "was of great value" when
kept secret.22  This decision expressly analyzed concepts of financial
investment and market capitalization that were only tangential to the
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York doctrines, thus broadening the
scope of what trade secret laws could protect.23
Trade secret law expanded and contracted throughout the next several
decades. A 1917 Massachusetts opinion distinguished "instances where
employ6s leave one employer and use their own faculties, skill and
experience in the establishment of an independent business" from
"instances where they use confidential information secured solely through
their employment to the harm of their previous employer." 2 4  This
distinction limited trade secret protection to information unique to the
business. A New York trial court further concluded that trade secret law
18. Salomon v. Hertz, 2 A. 379, 380 (N.J. Ch. 1886).
19. Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 12-13 (N.Y. 1889).
20. See Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 47 N.W. 814 (S.D. 1891).
21. Id. at 816.
22. Id.
23. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text. The notion of long-term economic
value loomed in the backdrop of those cases, of course. After all, the purpose of protecting
a manufacturing process or secret formulae was so that the business could profit off its own
development. However, those cases focused first on the classification of the information at
hand by determining if it was akin to a patentable invention or product. The Simmons
Hardware case flipped the perspective of the inquiry by looking beyond the mere
classification of the information and instead primarily analyzing the value assigned to it by
the business. Such an approach broadens the definition of trade secret. Whereas the
original approach seemed concentrated on critical components of business operations like
formulae and inventions, the South Dakota approach extended protection to any product that
a business developed and sought to use in furtherance of its business.
24. Aronson v. Orlov, 116 N.E. 951, 953 (Mass. 1917).
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was "not confined to secret processes of manufacture or methods of doing
business" and held that a customer list fell within the field of trade
secrets.2 5 Courts began shaping new definitions of trade secrets that
conformed to these changing contours. 26  Soon, trade secret law became
prevalent enough to warrant uniform commentary.
More than seventy years of common law development resulted in the
authoritative treatment of trade secrets in the Restatement (First) of Torts.
Restatement section 757 provided the elements for the tort of Disclosure or
Use of Another's Trade Secret.27 Comment (b) of that section established
the basic definition of a trade secret: "A trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it." 28  The meat of the
25. Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 112 N.Y.S. 874, 878 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1908). The
court went on to say:
The names of the customers of a business concern whose trade and patronage
have been secured by years of business effort and advertising, and the expenditure
of time and money, constituting a part of the good will of a business which
enterprise and foresight have built up, should be deemed just as sacred and
entitled to the same protection as a secret of compounding some article of
manufacture and commerce.
Id This decision was quoted at length and with approval by the Supreme Court of
California five years later. Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 130 P. 1180, 1183 (Cal. 1913).
26. See, e.g., Victor Chem. Works v. fliff, 132 N.E. 806, 811 (Ill. 1921) ("A trade secret
is a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his
employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.... A process commonly known in the
trade is not a trade secret and will not be protected by injunction, but the mere fact that there
are secret processes of a different kind accomplishing the same result will not prevent the
granting of an injunction.").
27. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
28. Id. § 757 cmt. b. The comment to section 757 continues by qualifying this general
definition and providing illustrative guidelines:
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of
customers. It differs from other secret information in a business (see § 759) in that
it is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the
business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract
or the salary of certain employees, or the security investments made or
contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for
bringing out a new model or the like. A trade secret is a process or device for
continuous use in the operation of the business. Generally it relates to the
production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of
an article. It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the
business, such as a code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in
a price list or catalogue, or a list of specialized customers, or a method of
bookkeeping or other office management.
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Restatement definition, though, came later in comment (b), when the
drafters provided a factor-based analysis for identifying trade secrets:
An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be
considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret
are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in
developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 29
This definition became the "one uniformly-recognized trade secret
definition" shortly after the Restatement was published. 30 Every United
States jurisdiction has used this definition to some extent.3 1
2. Turn to Statutory Law
Despite the Restatement's sweeping influence, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws decided in 1968 to
mobilize a committee to draft statutes that would bring trade secret law-
traditionally a common law innovation32-1nto the purview of state
legislatures. In August 1979, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was
published and recommended for enactment.34 One of the benefits of the
UTSA was standardization of the definition of a trade secret. 3 5  The
drafting committee declared that "[t]he contribution of the Uniform Act is
substitution of unitary definitions of trade secret and trade secret
misappropriation." 3 6 While the definition clearly built off the principles of
the Restatement definition and factors, it was also plainly different:
Id
29. Id
30. MiLGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 1.
31. Id
32. See Root & Blynn, supra note 11, at 823.
33. Id at 828. The authors identified three reasons for uniform codification: (1)
inconsistencies had arisen between the courts of different jurisdictions, (2) holes remained
in the doctrine after publication of the Restatement, and (3) the body of law had outgrown
its position as a subsection of tort law. Id at 828-29. There was also a strong academic call
for uniformity in the growing trade secrets doctrine. See, e.g, Comment, Theft of Trade
Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 380-81 (1971).
34. Root & Blynn, supra note 11, at 828.
35. Id. at 829.
36. UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT prefatory note (UNrF. LAW COMM'N 1985) (emphasis
added).
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"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy. 37
The Commissioners' Comment to the UTSA notes that the definition of
trade secret "contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts
(First) definition." 3 8  The UTSA was purposefully broader than the
Restatement definition.39  Considering the purpose of the UTSA-to
codify, standardize, and substitute for common law principles-and the
variations from the Restatement, it is clear that the UTSA was intended to
supplant the Restatement in the jurisdictions that eventually adopted it.
B. Trade Secrets in North Carolina
Trade secret law in North Carolina-like in the rest of the country-
originated in the judiciary before receiving legislative treatment. The
common law development, however, was scant; the doctrine only received
serious consideration by North Carolina courts after adoption of a trade
secret statute. This history is important not because North Carolina
experienced its own expansion and contraction of trade secret doctrine, but
rather because this lack of pre-statute history demonstrates how North
Carolina courts that revert to common law tests do so without any
compelling precedent.
1. Common Law Development in North Carolina
North Carolina courts scarcely entertained trade secrets cases before
the turn to statutory law. 40  A North Carolina appellate court first
meaningfully discussed trade secrets in 1961, when a dissenting justice
noted, "A trade secret is a new process, mechanism, or compound known
only to its owner and those employees to whom it has necessarily been
confided."' In 1975, the North Carolina Court of Appeals could not define
a trade secret under its own law and instead had to cite Washington law,
37. Id. § 1(4). The Uniform Act was published in 1979 and amended in 1985, but this
definition did not change between the two versions.
38. Id. § 1 comm'rs cmt
39. Id
40. See Root & Blynn, supra note 11, at 829.
41. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender, 120 S.E.2d 739, 746 (N.C. 1961) (Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 148).
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writing that "a trade secret has been defined as 'a secret formula or process,
not patented, known only to certain individuals who use it in compounding
or manufacturing some article of trade having a commercial value."", 2
The most significant judicial development of North Carolina trade
secret law occurred in two federal district courts-one of which did not sit
in the state.43 Even in those two cases, discussion of trade secrets was
slight. For instance, in Funchion v. Somerset Knitting Co., the Middle
District of North Carolina casually mentioned trade secrets within an
application of agency law, carelessly identifying trade secrets as "the
experiments and work of [an agent's] principal and the information
acquired in his efforts to promote his principal's interests.44 The court in
Funchion cited the Restatement but only during the discussion of damages
and without any substantial reliance on its principles.4 5
Perhaps the most significant discussion of North Carolina's common
law of trade secrets came from a distant forum: the Southern District of
Texas.46 The court heard a case that required application of North Carolina
law.47 Noting a severe lack of development in this area, the court relied on
general common law principles to form the definition of a trade secret.48
Despite neglecting to establish a clear elemental test for the identification
of a trade secret, the court found that the plaintiff possessed a trade secret
because it had "a formulation, discovered with difficulty and not generally
known nor readily discernible, which had potential commercial value,
which was only partially revealed to defendant and then in the context of a
confidential relationship, and which was otherwise protected in every
reasonable manner."" 9 The careful reader will note that this analysis
largely proceeds on the grounds of the six Restatement factors.50
Thus, by the late 1970s, North Carolina had a significantly
underdeveloped trade secret jurisprudence. The only binding state law on
42. Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 216 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting W.R. Frothingham, Annotation, Discovery or Inspection of
Trade Secret, Formula, or the Like, 17 A.L.R 2d 383 (1951)). In this case, the court of
appeals refused to confer trade secret status on a customer list. Id
43. See Root & Blynn, supra note 11, at 829.
44. Funchion v. Somerset Knitting Co., 158 F. Supp. 57, 62 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
45. See id at 63.
46. Tex. Urethane, Inc. v. Seacrest Marine Corp., 403 F. Supp. 612, 614-16 (S.D. Tex.
1975), af'd, 608 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1979). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit wrote that "little
North Carolina law on trade secrets exists; accordingly, we must look to common law
principles." Tex. Urethane, Inc., 608 F.2d at 138.
47. Tex. Urethane, Inc., 403 F. Supp. at 614.
48. Id at 614-15.
49. Id at 616.
50. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
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the topic defined a trade secret as (1) a secret formula or process (2) that is
not patented (3) that is used in commerce and (4) has commercial value."
A district court within the state only noted two requirements of a trade
secret: (1) experiments and work (2) used in commerce. 52 And, a district
court sitting in Texas loosely applied the Restatement factors when finding
a trade secret under North Carolina law. Although the Restatement
definition had acquired esteem by this point,54 there was no real North
Carolina common law on the definition of a trade secret.
2. North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act: The Current Law
Governing Secrets in the State
North Carolina quickly joined the states that started governing trade
secrets legislatively after publication of the UTSA. The General Assembly
enacted the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act (NCTSPA) in
198 1." It was "based, to a large degree, upon the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act."56  The NCTSPA begins with a definition section, which includes a
definition for trade secret:
"Trade secret" means business or technical information, including but not
limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information,
method, technique, or process that:
(a) Derives independent actual or potential commercial value from not
being generally known or readily ascertainable through independent
development or reverse engineering by persons who can obtain
economic value form its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy. 57
This differs in no material way from the UTSA definition.58 If the only
differences between the two definitions are inconsequential, then the theory
51. See Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 216 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. Ct. App.
1975).
52. See Funchion v. Somerset Knitting Co., 158 F. Supp. 57, 62 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
53. See Tex. Urethane, Inc., 403 F. Supp. at 616.
54. See MILGRIM & BENSON, supra note 1.
55. Act of July 9, 1981, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1326-28 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 66-152 to -157 (2017)).
56. Root & Blynn, supra note 11, at 831.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2017).
58. Cf UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW CoMM'N 1985). North Carolina
considered adopting the UTSA in full but instead opted to draft its own act with simpler
language. Root & Blynn, supra note 11, at 831. The differences between North Carolina's
act and the UTSA are "primarily cosmetic." Id Specific to the definition of trade secret,
"The North Carolina definition of 'trade secret' tracks the Uniform Act's definition with
652 [Vol. 40:2
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and commentary of the UTSA definition 9 should generally be imputed to
the North Carolina statutory definition. Thus, consistent with the policy
that the UTSA substitute for the common law, this legislative definition
should supersede any previous judicial constructions.
The language of the definition seems to set out an elemental test. The
statute says a trade secret "means" information "that" has value because of
its exclusivity "and is" the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy.60 This
is not the soft language that would accompany a factor test. Instead, the
statute suggests that information must actually check off all the boxes of
the definition to become a trade secret.6 1 Unfortunately, the North Carolina
General Assembly did not publish any comments or legislative history that
articulates its position on the type of test the definition provides.6 2 But, the
most straightforward reading of the text indicates an elemental test. Thus,
the general assembly has commanded courts to find a trade secret only
when the subject information, in short, is business or technical information
that meets two requirements: (1) it derives independent actual or potential
commercial value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable
by people who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use and (2)
it is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.63 Courts
should disregard any other criteria.
minor variations that should improve the operation of the North Carolina Act." Id at 836
(footnotes omitted). The only quasi-substantive difference is that the UTSA will find a
trade secret so long as the information is not readily ascertainable "by proper means," while
the North Carolina definition substitutes "independent development" and "reverse
engineering" in place of those words. David P. Hathaway, Comment, Is the North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act Itself a Secret, and Is the Act Worth Protecting?, 77 N.C. L.
REv. 2149, 2158 (1999). Additionally, the North Carolina definition could be read to be
broader because it includes the phrase "not limited to" when listing the types of information
that can constitute a trade secret at the beginning of the definition. Id
59. See supra Section I.A.2. This includes the portion of the commentary suggesting
that the UTSA definitions should substitute for common law or Restatement definitions.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT prefatory note.
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3).
61. For more discussion about how the statutory definition contains a set of elements
while the common law definition contains a set of factors, compare Fenwick & West LLP,
Trade Secrets Protection 2-3 (2001), https://perma.cclG6FG-7YQJ (describing the "four
elements" within California's version of the UTSA), with Gregory S. Bombard, Three Key
Distinctions Between the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Common Law, 17 A.B.A. SEC.
COM. & Bus. LITIG. 23, 23-24 (2016) (describing how New York and Massachusetts-two
states that have not adopted the UTSA-use the Restatement's six-factor balancing test,
which is different from the UTSA definition).
62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152.
63. The precise formulation of the elements can, of course, vary by interpreter. For
instance, some commentators have approached the terms of the statute more generally and
defined trade secrets as "information that: (1) is business or technical information, (2) has
6532018]
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Early cases interpreting the NCTSPA reflect this understanding. The
first court to apply the new statute found that the business information at
issue was a trade secret because it "satisfied the Statutory definition under
the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act."6 4  The district court
never considered any other factors. In Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, the
Eastern District of North Carolina wrote that North Carolina "defines a
trade secret as valuable business or technical information that a) is neither
'generally known nor readily ascertainable through independent
development or reverse engineering,' and b) has been subject to 'efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."' 66 The
court then said that a plaintiff must allege facts that "satisfy these two
requirements" to withstand summary judgment.67 Because the plaintiff in
that case repeatedly disclosed his information, the reasonable efforts prong
failed, such that the plaintiff could not maintain an action for trade secret
misappropriation.
Other cases throughout the early '90s copied this analysis, looking to
the requirements of the definition rather than considering additional factors.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in the 1991 case SE. TA. UNC-CH
Inc. v. Huffines, refused to find a trade secret when the information at issue
lacked any value and could "hardly be considered as a 'trade secret' as
actual or potential economic value stemming from its secrecy, and (3) the owner has made
the object of reasonable efforts to keep secret." Root & Blynn, supra note 11. One law firm
has interpreted the UTSA statute to have four elements: (1) information, (2) that derives
economic value from the fact it is secret, (3) that is not generally known, and (4) is the
subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. Fenwick & West LLP, supra note 61.
64. Moore v. Am. Barmag Corp., 710 F. Supp. 1050, 1060 (W.D.N.C. 1989). The
Federal Circuit eventually affirmed the district court's decision in an unpublished opinion
because "[t]he North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act limits a trade secret to 'business
or technical information' which '[i]s subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy."' Moore v. Am. Barmag Corp., No. 89-1524, 1990
WL 52409, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 27, 1990) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (1981)).
65. See Moore, 710 F. Supp. at 1060.
66. Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, 802 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
67. Id (emphasis added) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
68. Id. The court cited the Restatement comment when making its decision, even
though it never supplied the factors or set out to apply them. See id It is worth noting that
the court did not conduct the analysis completely correctly; even though it properly treated
the trade secrets definition as containing elements, it misstated the first element by removing
the consideration of value. See id at 1358-60. When the court stated that North Carolina
defines trade secrets as "valuable business or technical information," it improperly gave
short shrift to one of the most substantive parts of the definition. See id at 1360.
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defined above."6 9 In North Carolina Electric Membership Corp. v. North
Carolina Department of Economic and Community Development, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals provided only the statutory definition-as
opposed to the Restatement factors-and determined that a plaintiff could
establish a trade secret because the information would be valuable to its
competitors." Again, in 1993, the court of appeals had the opportunity to
consider a trade secrets case.71 The court quoted the definition of section
66-152(3) and then-for the purposes of finding whether a trade secret
existed-analyzed three issues: (1) whether the information was generally
known, (2) the reasonableness of the efforts to maintain secrecy, and (3)
whether the information was readily ascertainable.7 2 These issues all
sprung from the express language of the statutory definition. While they
also spoke to Restatement factors,74 the court of appeals limited its analysis
to those facts that alone could preclude the finding of a trade secret if
insufficient under the statutory language."
C. North Carolina's Reversion to the Common Law
In the immediate wake of the NCTSPA, courts directly applied the
definition statute and the simple test found therein. However, in 1997, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals issued a decision that soon became
seminal: Wilmington Star-News.76
1. Wilmington Star-News: The Impetus of Trade Secret Confusion
In Wilmington Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Regional Medical
Center, Inc., a newspaper was seeking disclosure of the price lists
contained in a contract between a public hospital and a private insurer.
69. S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines, 399 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasis added) (referencing the court's earlier quotation of section 66-152(3)).
70. N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.C. Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 425 S.E.2d
440, 444 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
71. See Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, 424 S.E.2d 226 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
72. See id at 229-30.
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2017).
74. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
75. Several other trade secrets cases were decided exclusively by reference to the
definition of section 66-152(3), with- the courts foregoing any analysis of the Restatement
factors. See, e.g., Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1996);
Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote
Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
76. Wilmington Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 53
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997).
77. Id. at 54.
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The hospital and insurer sought to avoid disclosure under the trade-secret
exemption within the Public Records Act." Thus, for the first time the
court had to determine whether price lists constituted a trade secret.
The court started on the right track, providing the full trade secret
definition as found in the NCTSPA.so It provided a straightforward,
statute-based test for finding a trade secret: "According to the plain
language of... 66-152(3), trade secrets may concern business information
that is formulated or compiled and that meets two requirements: (1) [t]he
information must have commercial value from not being known or readily
ascertainable; and (2) reasonable efforts must be made to keep the
information secret."81  Affirming the rule of Bank Travel Bank, the court
wrote that the plaintiff must "meet these two requirements of a trade
secret" to survive summary judgment.8 2 Then, the court took a
questionable turn.
Primarily because it was tasked with analyzing a new type of business
information, the court decided that section 66-152(3) "seems to require a
deeper inquiry." 83 It stated that "[o]ther jurisdictions in interpreting similar
trade secret statutes have determined the following factors should be
considered," thereafter listing the six Restatement factors verbatim.84 The
court then listed eleven facts it deemed relevant to the discussion and held
that a reasonable juror could find that a trade secret existed.8 ' The court
probably arrived at the right conclusion-there were sufficient facts to
meet the two requirements.8 6 However, the court unnecessarily
complicated the analysis by resurrecting the Restatement factors and
78. Id. at 55; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.2 (2017) (providing that a public agency
need not disclose information that is (1) a trade secret as defined by section 66-152(3), (2) is
private property, (3) is disclosed by the public agency in connection with the owner's
performance of a public contract, and (4) is designated as confidential or a trade secret at the
time of initial disclosure).
79. Wilmington Star-News, Inc., 480 S.E.2d at 54-55 (noting that this was an issue of
first impression in North Carolina).
80. Id. at 55-56.
81. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id; cf RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b(AM. LAW INST. 1939).
85. Wilmington Star-News, Inc., 480 S.E.2d at 57.
86. Regarding the information having commercial value from not being known or
readily ascertainable, the court found that disclosure of the financial terms would have
significantly benefitted the insurer's competitors and that disclosure would have been
detrimental to competition in the industry. Id Regarding reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy, the court found that the parties treated the information as confidential, entered into
a confidentiality agreement, and that the hospital restricted access to the price lists. Id
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considering irrelevant facts.8 1 Worse, the court set into motion a new line
of cases that created the trade secret problems that exist today.
2. Subsequent Cases Follow Wilmington Star-News and Revive
Common Law
The next time the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a
significant trade secrets case after Wilmington-Star News,8 9 it again
employed the Restatement factors-this time with more gusto.90 Similar to
Wilmington-Star News, the case arose in the context of a public disclosure
action.91 The public agencies seeking to enjoin the required disclosure
argued that the information contained in reports and questionnaires
constituted a trade secret.92 The court set out the statutory definition of a
trade secret and then wrote, "When determining whether information is a
trade secret, the following factors are proper to consider." 9 3  The court
listed the six Restatement factors and renamed them the "Wilmington Star-
News factors."94 Oddly, the court said it reviewed the factors, but its
holding spoke only to the statutory requirements.9 5 However, the court
clearly reaffirmed the use of the factors in trade secret analysis, as indicated
by its commanding language of "are proper,, 9 6 as opposed to Wilmington
87. The court examined the following facts that speak to no real requirement of a trade
secret: the insurer's subjective consideration of the price list as confidential; the market in
which the hospital and insurer operate; the difficulty that the insurer's competitors would
experience when trying to replicate the list; and whether there was any testimony
expounding on the price or difficulty of generating the list. Id Although these facts bear on
the Restatement factors, section 66-152(3) provides no place for their consideration. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2017).
88. See infra Part II.
89. The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided one trade secrets case between
Wilmington Star-News and Utilities Commission. See Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 501 S.E.2d
353 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). However, the court gave fairly little attention to the trade secrets
issue after more thoroughly discussing the enforceability of employment contracts. See id
at 354-57.
90. State ex. rel. Utils. Comm'n v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 514 S.E.2d 276, 282 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1999).
91. Id at 279.
92. Id at 282.
93. Id (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. See id ("Our review of the Wilmington Star-News factors in the context of section
66-152(3) reveals that the information ... has 'actual or potential commercial value from
not being generally known' and is 'the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.' The information thus constitutes 'trade secret[s]'
within the meaning of [the Public Records Act].").
96. Id
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Star-News's softer language of "other jurisdictions ... have determined the
following factors should be considered." 97
The Restatement factors became affixed in trade secrets cases. In
Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping, Inc. v. Smith, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals repeated that the factors are "properly considered." 98 Using these
factors, the court concluded that (1) the information was not known outside
the business,99 (2) employees within the business did not know the
information,100 (3) the owner took measures to guard the secrecy of the
information,' (4) the information was valuable to both the business and its
competitors,1 02 and (5) the owner expended money and effort in developing
the information.10 3 The court also considered the sixth factor-regarding
the ease with which the information could be acquired or duplicated-but
seemingly ignored the "evidence offered by defendant that similar
information may have been ascertainable by anyone in the lawn
maintenance and landscape business." 0 4  Thus, although there was
evidence in the record that the information could not meet one of the
statutory requirements, the court still found that a trade secret existed
because all of the other factors weighed toward the plaintiff.'
Similarly, the trial and appellate courts in Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v.
Head & Engquist Equipment, L.L.C. showed no hesitation to apply the
Restatement factors. 06
97. Wilmington Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 53,
56 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).
98. Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping, Inc. v. Smith, 542 S.E.2d 689, 692 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001).
99. Id ("The information was treated as confidential by Mr. Byrd. . .
100. Id ("Therefore, Mr. Byrd did not even share the information with plaintiffs
employees.").
101. Id. ("The information was kept by Mr. Byrd, first in a notebook and then on
computer.").
102. Id. ("Mr. Byrd .. . used the information to prepare bids for the various properties
upon which plaintiff performed services. Many of the accounts had to be rebid each year.
Mr. Byrd testified that someone with access to these records could use the information to
underbid plaintiff on any of its contracts.").
103. Id. ("Plaintiff offered evidence ... that it had maintained detailed cost records as to
the materials, labor and equipment required for each of its contracts over a period of
seventeen years.").
104. Id
105. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of
this problem.
106. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head & Engquist Equip., L.L.C., 620 S.E.2d 222, 226-29
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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The trial court determined such information was (1) not generally known
outside BPS; (2) only discreetly disclosed within BPS; (3) guarded as
secret (e.g. information removed from view when outsiders visited BPS'
premises, pricing kept in special books, passwords used to protect computer
access, file removal rules, and salary information kept under lock and key);
(4) competitively valuable; (5) developed at significant cost to BPS; and (6)
difficult to duplicate or acquire. 107
The court of appeals, after restating the trial court's factual conclusions in a
way that made it seem as if it was applying a totality-of-the-circumstances
test, affirmed the trial court's finding of a trade secret.' 08 More than a
decade later, analysis like the trial court's in Sunbelt Rentals is now
commonplace.' 0 9 Some trial courts, such as that in 360 Mortgage Group,
have gone so far as providing a full paragraph of analysis for each factor
before making the ultimate conclusion of whether a trade secret exists
based on a balancing of those factors.o
In sum, despite North Carolina's turn to a statutory definition of trade
secrets in 1981, courts in the state have resurrected common law
considerations when determining whether a trade secret exists. The result
is a dueling body of law: a statutory definition versus a judicially created
definition, with courts that inconsistently choose which to apply and how to
apply it.
II. NORTH CAROLINA'S TRADE SECRET PROBLEMS
The bifurcated development of the trade secret definition has thrown
trade secret jurisprudence into disarray. The introduction of the
Restatement factors is an interesting quandary in many ways. For instance,
it is unclear how or why the factors arrived in North Carolina law. The
Restatement factors developed as a codification of common law throughout
the country, but North Carolina essentially had no common law in this
area.'" The courts did not use the factors until roughly fifteen years after a
statutory definition was enacted." 2 Thus, the courts resurrected a judicially
107. Id. at 227-28.
108. Id. at 228.
109. See, e.g, 360 Mortg. Grp., LLC v. Stonegate Mortg. Corp., No. 5:14-CV-00310-F,
2016 WL 4943933, at *5-*6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2016); Combs & Assocs., Inc. v. Kennedy,
555 S.E.2d 634, 640 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("From this statutory definition, our courts have
fashioned six factors which are to be considered when determining whether information is a
trade secret....");. Comput. Design & Integration, LLC v. Brown, No. 16 CVS 11847,
2017 NCBC 8, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2017).
110. 360 Mortg. Grp., LLC, 2016 WL 4943933, at *5-*6.
111. See supra Section I.B.
112. See supra Section I.C.1.
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created test that they had never before used, and they did so in spite of
preexisting legislative guidance. The North Carolina judiciary has never
questioned this oddity, though. In fact, the court of appeals seems to ignore
this legal fiction altogether. In Sunbelt Rentals, the court wrote that it had
previously found trade secrets in various types of information while
"[a]pplying these factors."'"3 There was one slight problem, though: one of
the cases cited by the Sunbelt Rentals court predated Wilmington Star-News
and never once mentioned the word "factor."" l 4 In short, the court of
appeals used the factors test even though one of the decisions it cited
employed the statutory elemental test.
In addition to the foible of grasping the factors test from thin air, there
are fundamental problems associated with modern trade secret precedent.
Whereas a statute provides a cause of action and a test for what constitutes
a valid suit, a judicially created test often controls the outcome of the case.
This Comment discusses three of those problems: the theoretical problem
of the judiciary ignoring a legislative directive, the substantive problem of
changing the law, and the practical problem of confusing practitioners who
litigate trade secrets cases.
A. Theoretical Problem: The Judicial Branch Ignoring a Legislative
Mandate
Though the first problem has no tangible effect on trade secret
application, it rests uneasy on legal idealists. In this instance, the North
Carolina legislature has established a clear definition of a trade secret, yet
the courts have fashioned their own definition and test. This contravenes
basic separation of powers tenets. 15
The United States Supreme Court has long held that the "sole
function" of a court is to enforce a statute by its terms.1 16 As the Third
Circuit has written, "The words of a statute are not to be lightly jettisoned
by courts looking to impose their own logic on a statutory scheme."'"7 The
Third Circuit has further expounded upon this concept:
113. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 620 S.E.2d at 226.
114. See id at 226 (citing Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., 423 S.E.2d
324, 327 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)).
115. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers
shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.").
116. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)).
117. In re Visteon Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Terlingo, 327 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)).
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"[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there." It is for Congress, not the courts,
to enact legislation. When courts disregard the language Congress has used
in an unambiguous statute, they amend or repeal that which Congress
enacted into law. Such a failure to defer to the clearly expressed statutory
language of Congress runs contrary to the bedrock principles of our
democratic society.118
North Carolina has incorporated this longstanding constitutional doctrine
into its own jurisprudence. In Orange County ex rel. Byrd v. Byrd, the
court of appeals wrote that it was "not free to either ignore or amend
legislative enactments because when the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the courts must give it its plain meaning." 19
No court has ever contended that section 66-152(3) is ambiguous,
unconstitutional, or otherwise objectionable. The judiciary is supposed to
show restraint to honor the legislature's command and enforce the statute
as written. Instead, the courts have abandoned the statutory definition in
lieu of a definition and test it created itself. The judiciary has exceeded its
province by commandeering trade secret doctrine from the North Carolina
General Assembly.
B. Substantive Problem: Employment of the Restatement Approach
Changes the Test
The most significant of the three problems discussed herein is the
substantive problem. That is, the judiciary has changed the law by
applying its factor test instead of the statutory test when identifying trade
secrets.
The discussion in Section I.B.2 of this Comment highlights the chief
distinction between the common law and statutory definitions of trade
secret: the Restatement instructs the court to use factors to find a trade
secret, while the North Carolina statute appears to be more rigid.
Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping is illustrative of this problem. There, the
court compiled a long list of facts, all of which helped satisfy one or more
of the first five Restatement factors.' 20 There were, however, no facts that
satisfied the sixth Restatement factor, 12 1 which is "the ease or difficulty
with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by
118. Id at 220 (citation omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253-54 (1992)).
119. Orange Cty. ex rel. Byrd v. Byrd, 501 S.E.2d 109, 112 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
120. See Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping, Inc. v. Smith, 542 S.E.2d 689, 692 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001).
121. Id.
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others."l2 2 In fact, the court wrote that the defendant offered evidence that
"similar information may have been ascertainable by anyone in the lawn
maintenance and landscape business." 12 3  Looking back to section
66-152(3) of the NCTSPA, part of the subsection (a) requirement is that the
information is not "generally known or readily ascertainable through
independent development or reverse engineering."l2 4 Had the court applied
the straightforward, elemental test of the NCTSPA, it would have been
compelled to find that there was no trade secret because the information
was readily ascertainable. However, the court of appeals, electing to apply
the factors test instead of the statutory test, overlooked the failure of that
element. Instead, it held that "[n]otwithstanding" the evidence of
ascertainability,
plaintiffs evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to it, is
sufficient to sustain a finding by the jury that plaintiffs cost history records
were "a compilation of information, method, technique, or process" which
was treated by plaintiff as confidential, was neither known outside
plaintiffs business nor shared with its employees, which had value to
plaintiff and potential value to plaintiff s competitors, and which could not
be easily acquired by others who had not performed similar services on the
same properties from which plaintiffs cost history information was
acquired.
Despite the apparent statutory shortcoming of the plaintiffs case, the court
found that a trade secret existed. 126 Through the use of loose factors and
standards, courts are able to arbitrarily decide which indicia of a trade
secret are sufficient to support a claim. This is not the strict test that the
statutory definition provides.
The Restatement test also changes the law because it changes the facts
courts are supposed to consider. 127 Most notably, factor (5) is completely
absent from the statutory definition; the North Carolina General Assembly
does not to care how much money or effort the business spent developing
122. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
123. Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping, Inc., 542 S.E.2d at 692.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3)(a) (2017); see also Bank Travel Bank v. McCoy, 802
F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (stating expressly that it is a "requirement" of a trade
secret that it not be known or generally ascertainable).
125. Byrd's Lawn & Landscaping, Inc., 542 S.E.2d at 692.
126. See id
127. The six Restatement factors are: (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of the business, (2) the extent to which the information is known by those inside the
business, (3) the extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information, (4) the
value of the information to the business, (5) the amount of effort or money spent in
developing the information, and (6) the ease with which the information could be duplicated
by others. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
662 [Vol. 40:2
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss2/8
REDEFINING TRADE SECRETS IN NORTH CAROLINA
the information, so long as the information meets the requirements of not
being generally known and subject to reasonable efforts to preserve
secrecy.128 Additionally, factor (2) has no real place inside the statutory
definition. Section 66-152(3) requires that information be sufficiently
secret to warrant protection. 129 However, the statute seems to be external-
facing-it speaks to whether information is "generally known" and whether
competitors could reverse-engineer the same information. 130  This
interpretation is supported by the commentary to the UTSA, which
mentions the "general public" and the "industry" when discussing whether
information is generally known.1 3 1  The statute does not contemplate
internal discussions about the information.
While the other four factors are tied to language in the statute, the
framing of those criteria is distinct between the two approaches. The
Restatement uses amorphous language such as "extent to which" and
"value of." 13 2 The statute, on the other hand, contains more definite terms.
Section 66-152(3) asks whether the information has value, not how much
value it has.1 3 3 It requires the owner of the information take "reasonable"
efforts to maintain secrecy, as opposed to weighing the "extent" of those
measures. 13 4 It provides a standard that information is "not. .. generally
known or readily ascertainable" instead of analyzing the "extent" to which
it is known.135 These distinctions, while seemingly slight, open the door for
capricious adjudication. They reinforce the uncertainty that already
accompanies a factor-balancing test. Instead of engaging in the binary
inquiry of each individual requirement, a court applying loose factors like
these would be influenced to examine the intensity with which factors tip
toward a party.
As an example, it would be a natural tendency for a court to excuse
how readily ascertainable information is when the owner went to the most
extreme measures to guard its secrecy and it held immense commercial
128. Cf N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3).
129. Id.
130. See id
131. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985). The comment
more explicitly states that "[i]f the principal persons who can obtain economic benefit from
information are aware of [the information], there is no trade secret." Id It is a business's
competitors who can obtain a benefit from knowing information, not those who are working
with the information inside the business. Thus, the statute appears to largely disregard any
consideration of whether the information is known inside the business.
132. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
133. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3).
134. Id; cf RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (emphasis added); cf RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§ 757 cmt. b.
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value. A sympathetic court would find a trade secret, even though the
general assembly would not. On the other side of the spectrum, consider a
case where the owner took barely reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy of
information, the information was slightly known throughout the industry,
and the information was fairly valuable to the owner. Under the statutory
definition, each of the requirements is met, and the owner has an
enforceable trade secret. Under the factor-balancing test with its "extent
to" language, a court could find that, on the whole, the information is
unworthy of trade secret protection. This is the uncertainty that occasions a
split legal doctrine. The judiciary should seek to avoid inconsistent results.
It is important to note that the North Carolina definition still largely
encompasses the principles that developed through the common law and
composed the Restatement treatment. 13 6 This understanding informs the
court about what the language of the statute means and how to apply the
tests found in the statutory definition.' 3 ' However, the judiciary is incorrect
to think that this backdrop permits it to ignore a legislative directive,
particularly when such a tangent fundamentally affects the rights of
litigants.
C. Practical Problem: Practitioner Confusion
The third problem is that the law's development undoubtedly
frustrates practitioners. It is one thing to have two laws that could govern a
case. It is another for the courts to not always know which to apply.
For instance, in the first trade secrets case the court of appeals decided
after Wilmington Star-News, the court proceeded exclusively on statutory
grounds.13 8 The court quoted section 66-152(3) in full before making the
conclusory statement that "the record shows that the information
defendants claim as trade secrets is 'readily ascertainable through
independent development."' 1 3 9  With that, the court affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that there was no trade secret. 14 0  This seemed to
indicate that the court would follow the statutory guidance and refuse to
identify a trade secret when any portion of the definition was insufficient.
136. Root& Blynn, supra note 11, at 837.
137. For instance, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied section 66-152(3) when
analyzing a trade secrets case but still resorted to common law precedent regarding how
secret information must be to still be not "generally known" and how difficult reverse-
engineering must be to make it not "readily ascertainable." Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning,
424 S.E.2d 226, 229-30 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
138. See Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 501 S.E.2d 353, 357 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
13 9. Id.
140. Id
664 [Vol. 40:2
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss2/8
REDEFINING TRADE SECRETS IN NORTH CAROLINA
Then, in the next trade secrets case before the court of appeals, the court
doubled down on the Wilmington Star-News factors and set out to apply
each of them. 14 1
This pattern has persisted more recently. In the 2001 case of Combs
& Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy, the court of appeals affirmatively stated that
courts have "fashioned six factors" from section 66-152(3) that courts
should use when determining whether a trade secret exists. 142 In the 2013
case of GE Betz, Inc. v. Conrad, the same court applied only section 66-
152(3) of the NCTSPA and found that a trade secret existed because it fit
within the statutory definition. 143
Even when courts decide to apply the Restatement definition, they do
so inconsistently. Some courts employ a classic factor-balancing test,
examining each and every factor and then making a determination at the
end of who has the best case.144 On the other hand, a trial court recently
wrote that "[t]he factors overlap, and courts considering these factors do
not always examine them separately and individually." 14 5
A fairly recent case from the North Carolina Business Court
demonstrates the confusion that arises from an inconsistent body of law.
There, the plaintiff asked the court to consider each of the six factors before
determining whether a trade secret existed. 14 6 The defendant, on the other
hand, asked the court to summarily reject the trade secrets claim once it
became clear that the information was previously made publicly
available.' 47 The court struggled with application of the law.14 It noted
that the North Carolina Court of Appeals has relied on the six-factor test,
even writing that disclosure alone would not necessitate the rejection of a
trade secret claim based on this balancing test. 14 9 But, the court then relied
on a series of cases applying the UTSA when it eventually held that
generally available information cannot obtain trade secret status.150
141. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
142. Combs & Assocs., Inc. v. Kennedy, 555 S.E.2d 634, 640 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
143. GE Betz, Inc. v. Conrad, 752 S.E.2d 634, 649-50 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
144. See, e.g., 360 Mortg. Grp., LLC v. Stonegate Mortg. Corp., No. 5:14-CV-00310-F,
2016 WL 4943933, at *5-*6 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2016)
145. Comput Design & Integration, LLC v. Brown, No. 16 CVS 11847, 2017 WL
442691, at *8 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2017) (citing SCR-Tech LLC v. Evonik Energy
Servs. LLC, No. 08 CVS 16632, 2011 NCBC 26 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 22, 2011)).
146. Evonik Energy Servs. LLC, 2011 NCBC at 40.
147. Id.
148. See id at 41.
149. Id.
150. Id at 44 & nn.106-09.
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The court's ultimate resolution of the issue is beside the point. This
litigation involved three of the most sophisticated law firms in the North
Carolina legal market. Yet, they could not even agree on which law
applied and how the court should apply that law.
III. THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN THE
FACTOR TEST
In light of such pressing problems, North Carolina needs to resolve the
tension between the statutory trade secrets definition and the common law
trade secrets definition. North Carolina is not alone in adjudicating trade
secrets in this way; the vast majority of states continues to use the
Restatement factors, despite a uniform trade secrets definition that has been
nearly universally adopted."' However, North Carolina has been willing to
lead legal reform in the past,'5 2 and it should do so again in this context.
The solution is quite simple: North Carolina courts should drop the
use of factors and instead apply section 66-152(3) when analyzing whether
a trade secret exists. Courts should look exclusively to the statutory
definition of a trade secret and the elemental test that is built into it. The
inquiry is straightforward: if the information is of the kind enumerated at
the top of the statute and meets the requirements found in the subsections,
then a trade secret exists. If the plaintiff insufficiently proves satisfaction
of one of the requirements, then there is no trade secret. There is no need
for complex examination of all the facts of the case; all that is required of
the courts is to decide whether all the boxes are checked.
Taking this approach would cure the separation of powers problem
that arose when the court decided to make its own law, contravening the
legislature's intention. This would also provide one, uniform law devoid of
substantive inconsistencies and practitioner confusion. Businesses would
know exactly what they need to do to protect their valuable, confidential
information, and the judicial system protecting their interests would
adjudicate cases more consistently and efficiently.
North Carolina has examples of the proper way to consider trade
secrets cases. For instance, the North Carolina Court of Appeals heard a
trade secrets claim in 2007 that concerned a steel truck part.1 53 The court
151. See MILGRIM & BENSON, supra note 1.
152. Johnny C. Chriscoe, A Plea to North Carolina: Bring Fairness to the Assessment of
Civil Battery Liability for Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 39 CAMPBELL L. REV.
241, 268 (2017) (discussing North Carolina's institution of the business court to handle
complex business litigation).
153. Griffith v. Glen Wood Co., 646 S.E.2d 550, 553-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
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set out the definition found in section 66-152(3).154 Then, the court
highlighted the plaintiffs admission that his part was "readily ascertainable
through reverse engineering.", 15 That was all it took; the court treated that
admission as the failure of a critical element of a trade secret claim,
therefore holding that the part could not be a trade secret as a matter of
law.15 6 The court did not engage in any further analysis of the extent to
which the part was ascertainable, how valuable the part was, the ease with
which the part could have been reverse-engineered, or how many people
inside the plaintiff's business knew about the part."' It treated the statutory
requirements as binary and made the simple conclusion when one of the
requirements failed."5
The successful analysis in that case highlights a main feature of the
statutory definition: it is workable. Courts using the elements within the
statutory definition had no problem adjudicating trade secrets cases before
Wilmington Star-News. No court that retreated to the common law factors
noted any difficulties or ambiguities within the statute-in fact, they never
gave much of a reason to use the factors at all. The statutory definition was
carefully drafted by a commission of experts, and it was enacted by the
substantial majority of the states.159 This adoption would not have occurred
if the statute lacked clarity. The drafters of the UTSA-and by extension
the NCTSPA-incorporated a century of trade secret expansion and
contraction into a settled, workable definition. Simply put, this is not an
area of law that needed judicial salvation.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has never before decided a trade
secrets case or interpreted section 66-152(3). The good news about this
solution is that the high court has a prime opportunity to set the record
straight. Under North Carolina's Business Court Modernization Act, any
party in litigation may designate a case as a mandatory complex business
case if a material issue in the case relates to trade secrets.1 60 Appeals from
such mandatory complex business cases bypass the court of appeals and
proceed directly to the supreme court.1 6 ' Thus, the North Carolina
Supreme Court can address this legal discrepancy carte blanche; it is not
controlled by the preexisting court of appeals law. When that opportunity
154. Id. at 558.
155. Id.
156. Id
157. See id
158. See id
159. See MILGRIM & BENSON, supra note 1.
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.4(a)(8) (2017).
161. Id. § 7A-27(a)(2).
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arrives, the court should resolve these issues and preclude future use of the
knotty Restatement definition.
CONCLUSION
Trade secret doctrine developed rapidly and thoroughly through the
common law. At the time, the Restatement provided a great service by
codifying a universal treatment of the topic; however, that common law
lost relevance when legislatures throughout the country opted to protect
trade secrets legislatively. Courts have had a difficult time accepting this
new reality. This is particularly true in North Carolina, where trial courts
and the court of appeals have resurrected the Restatement factors when
determining whether a trade secret exists. Such a resurrection does a
disservice to the state. The judiciary has not only created a separation of
powers issue with the general assembly but also birthed a body of law that
is unnecessarily complex.
The North Carolina Supreme Court should step in and correct the
lower courts' errors. It is the legislature's role to create law, and that is
what it has chosen to do by passing the NCTSPA. The supreme court
should not permit the lower courts to modify that law by considering
additional factors and fundamentally changing how the test for a trade
secret functions. Given the structure of the North Carolina business courts,
the North Carolina Supreme Court should soon hear a case that bears on
trade secrets. When it does, it should resolve the problems in trade secrets
litigation by prohibiting future use of the factors analysis. The state already
has a trade secret definition-it doesn't need two.
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